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23 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Proposed Community Response to the China
Intelligence Problem

1. On ¹⁹~~27~~ May 1965 the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board requested me to report to the Board what actions of a long-term nature the USIB might consider taking to increase the quality and quantity of US intelligence on Communist China. On 17 June the USIB approved the recommendations of the CCPC relating to intelligence activities against Communist China (USIB-D-64.6/31). At that time the Chairman stated his conviction that measures must be developed to provide for continuing scrutiny of the community effort on the Communist China problem and for appropriate advice and recommendations to the DCI and USIB on actions to correct deficiencies or achieve improvements. I was asked to submit for USIB consideration proposals to accomplish these measures and to make recommendations for long-term actions on

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this general subject. It is clear from the discussions at the Board on ¹⁶16 May and 17 June that the Board collectively and the Board members individually regard the improvement of intelligence on Communist China to be one of their major responsibilities. It also appeared to be the consensus of the Board that, in addition to establishing some mechanism for carrying out the measures described by the Chairman, it would be desirable to inform such high level policy officials as the Secretaries of State and Defense of the actions being taken by the community and of the major problems foreseen in providing adequate intelligence on China. Accordingly, I recommend that USIB:

- a. Establish a China Intelligence Steering Group, with composition, mission and functions as stated in Tab A.
- b. Approve the draft memorandum (TAB B) from the Chairman to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

2. Establishment of the proposed China Intelligence Steering Group would represent a significant change in the practice of the Board with respect to committee support. Such support has hitherto been organized on a functional basis - for example, Sigint Committee, Scientific Intelligence Committee, Economic Intelligence Committee, Security Committee, etc. The Board has not, up to this time, established a body to deal with a geographic intelligence problem area for the purpose of bringing to a focus all the functional activities which might have a

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bearing upon it. The urgent necessity of concentrating and correlating the various activities of the community which contribute now, or can be made to contribute in the future, to our intelligence on China, justifies, in my opinion, this exception to the Board's traditional policy.

3. Each USIB member will obviously have to decide for himself what, if any additional internal organizational or functional changes will be necessary to meet this challenge of improving intelligence on China. In CIA we are coming to the belief that it will be necessary to have a single individual designated as the focal point within the Agency for our intelligence efforts on China and are examining the implications of such a decision on our organizational structure and our functional procedures. I suggest that each USIB member examine the feasibility of similarly emphasizing the unity (intellectual if not necessarily administrative) of the China intelligence problem in his own agency. We would be pleased to compare notes with other agencies on this matter and how USIB members could assist each other within the framework of the proposed China Intelligence Steering Group.

4. I am attaching as Tab C for the information of the Board Members the conclusions of the recent Quadripartite Conference on China.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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TAB A

Composition, Mission and Functions of USIB China Intelligence

Steering Group

1. Composition. The China Intelligence Steering Group will consist of a senior China expert from each of the member agencies of USIB and a Chairman selected by the DCI in consultation with USIB.
2. Mission. The China Intelligence Steering Group is responsible to USIB for ensuring that the long-term intelligence effort against Communist China provides the maximum pertinent information to support the policies and operations of the United States Government related to Communist China.
3. Functions. The China Intelligence Steering Group will:
 - a. Formulate and recommend to USIB a China Intelligence program against which the long-term efforts of the community can be directed and evaluated, taking into consideration the recommendations of the CCPC, the conclusions of the Quadripartite Conference, and appropriate Post Mortems to NIK's.
 - b. Review and evaluate, on a continuing basis, intelligence activities of the community directed against Communist

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TAB A

China, and recommend to USIB appropriate measures for achieving the approved intelligence program objectives.

- c. Make appropriate recommendations to USIB for the prevention of unwarranted duplication in the intelligence activities of the various agencies with respect to Communist China, and for such other adjustments of the community effort as may be required for increased effectiveness.
- d. Investigate and make appropriate recommendations to USIB regarding the use of extra-government research and analysis resources to assist in the effort against Communist China.

4. Procedures.

- a. The China Intelligence Steering Group is authorized to call upon the Committees of USIB for assistance and advice within their respective areas of responsibility.
- b. The China Intelligence Steering Group is authorized to call upon the Foreign Area Research Coordinating Group and the External Research Staff of the Department of State for advice and assistance in matters relating to extra-government research.

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TAB A

- c. The China Intelligence Steering Group may utilize the services of China experts, from inside or outside the government, on an ad hoc basis for particular problems.
- d. CIA will furnish the necessary secretariat services for the China Intelligence Steering Group.

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